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ABSTRACT
We address the problem of secure data deletion on log-
structured file systems. We focus on the YAFFS file sys-
tem, widely used on Android smartphones. We show that
these systems provide no temporal guarantees on data dele-
tion and that deleted data still persists for nearly 44 hours
with average phone use and indefinitely if the phone is not
used after the deletion. Furthermore, we show that file over-
writing and encryption, methods commonly used for secure
deletion on block-structured file systems, do not ensure data
deletion in log-structured file systems.
We propose three mechanisms for secure deletion on log-
structured file systems. Purging is a user-level mechanism
that guarantees secure deletion at the cost of negligible de-
vice wear. Ballooning is a user-level mechanism that runs
continuously and gives probabilistic improvements to se-
cure deletion. Zero overwriting is a kernel-level mecha-
nism that guarantees immediate secure deletion without de-
vice wear. We implement these mechanisms on Nexus One
smartphones and show that they succeed in secure deletion
and neither prohibitively reduce the longevity of the flash
memory nor noticeably reduce the device’s battery lifetime.
These techniques provide mobile phone users more confi-
dence that data they delete from their phones are indeed
deleted.
1. INTRODUCTION
Deleting a file from a storage medium serves two purposes: it
reclaims storage and ensures that any sensitive information
contained in the file is no longer accessible. When done
for the latter purpose, it is critical that the file is securely
deleted, meaning that its content does not persist on the
storage medium after deletion.
Secure deletion is almost always ignored in file system de-
sign [2, 3, 7, 11, 14, 17], largely for performance reasons.
Typically, deletion is implemented as a rapid operation where
a file is unlinked, meaning its metadata states that it is no
longer present while the file’s contents remain in storage
until overwritten by new data [4]. While many users ex-
pect that deleting messages will delete them, clearing the
browser’s history will clear it, and changing their location
will overwrite their previous location, in reality this infor-
mation remains on their devices without any guarantees of
deletion. Surveys of repurposed hard drives found that many
contained private financial or medical data that could be re-
covered with trivial forensic cost and effort [4]. However,
secure deletion is not only important when media is repur-
posed; it also enables users to protect the confidentiality of
their data if their devices are compromised, stolen, or con-
fiscated under a subpoena. In the case of a subpoena, the
user may be forced to disclose all passwords, keys, or other
credentials that enable access to the data stored on the de-
vice; in such a scenario, users can only sanitize their device
before it is seized.
Secure deletion is particularly important on modern smart-
phones, as they increasingly store personal data such as the
owner’s private conversations, browsing history, and location
history. Mobile phones further store business data, which
for company policy or legal reasons should be deleted after
some time elapses or should not be available at some ge-
ographic locations, e.g., should be deleted before a phone
owner leaves a certain jurisdiction. Currently, the only se-
cure deletion option available on the Android mobile phone
is the factory reset : a procedure that securely erases all user
data on the phone, returning the phone to its initial state.
This is clearly inappropriate for users who wish to selectively
delete data, such as some emails, but retain other data, such
as their address books or installed applications.
Secure deletion mechanisms have been proposed for some
widely-used block-structured and journalled file systems, like
ext2 and ext3 [1, 8, 9]. These mechanisms typically modify
the kernel and enforce that when a file is marked for deletion
it is overwritten with arbitrary data. Another mechanism
that was proposed for preserving data confidentiality under
device seizure is full-drive encryption, where the decryption
key is generated from user’s password upon system boot.
This mechanism is effective but has limitations: users can
be coerced or legally bound to disclose their credentials, or
might be legally obliged to delete data.
In this work, we address secure deletion on modern smart-
phones with a focus on the file system YAFFS [3]. Un-
like ext2 and ext3, YAFFS is a log-structured file system
ar
X
iv
:1
10
6.
09
17
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  5
 Ju
n 2
01
1
developed specifically for flash memory storage. Android
phones’ internal memory uses YAFFS to store data such as
browsing cache, maps cache, names of nearby wireless net-
works, GPS location data, SMS messages, electronic mails,
and telephone call listings.
We analyze how deletion is performed in YAFFS and show
that log-structured file systems provide no temporal guar-
antees on data deletion; deleted data persists for around 44
hours with average phone use (Nexus One [5]) and indefi-
nitely if the phone is not used after the deletion. Further-
more, we show that mechanisms such as file overwriting or
encryption of individual files, proposed for data deletion on
block-structured file systems [12, 6] do not ensure data dele-
tion in log-structured file systems. Namely, overwriting a file
in log-structured file systems simply writes a new version of
a file, but does not remove the original copy. Similarly, when
a file is encrypted, the ciphertext will be written to a new lo-
cation, but the plaintext will remain on the flash drive until
storage space is needed and garbage collection is invoked.
We propose three mechanisms for secure deletion in YAFFS,
two programs at user-level and one kernel-level file system
change. The two user-level mechanisms are purging, which
provides guaranteed rapid deletion of all data previously
marked to be deleted, and ballooning, a continuous opera-
tion that reduces the expected time that any piece of deleted
data remains on the medium. The third mechanism is zero
overwriting, a kernel-level file system change that securely
deletes any data the moment it is removed from the file sys-
tem.
We implement these mechanisms for the Nexus One smart-
phone and show that they neither prohibitively reduce the
longevity of the flash memory nor noticeably reduce the de-
vice’s battery lifetime. The purging operation occupies the
phone for half a minute, but it can be configured to run dur-
ing the phone’s idle time. Ballooning provides a trade off
between the time until data is securely erased and the re-
sulting wear on the flash memory. Zero overwriting securely
deletes data immediately without imposing any additional
wear on the device. However, it has the drawback of requir-
ing kernel-level modifications and may not be suitable for
all flash memories.
Finally, we discuss the conditions under which our mech-
anisms can be applied to other log-structured file systems
such as JFFS, and propose a modification to UBI—a higher-
level flash interface—that would implement ballooning on
any flash file system that makes use of it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we give background on flash memory and file systems. In
Section 3 we examine the current state of secure deletion in
YAFFS. In Sections 4 and 5 we present our three solutions,
along with experimental results. In Section 6 we discuss
related work and in Section 7 we discuss generalizations of
our approach and introduce future work.
2. SYSTEMMODEL AND BACKGROUND
System Model. We consider a scenario in which users have
data on their mobile device that they wish to securely delete.
This includes cache files that should be continually deleted,
such as their location histories as encoded by the names of
the wireless networks and cellular base stations with which
their devices communicated.
The adversary that we consider in this paper is the coer-
cion attacker, the strongest attacker for the data deletion
problem. The attacker can—at any moment—both obtain
the user’s device and compel the user to reveal any secret
keys and passphrases [13]. The unpredictable nature of the
attack prevents the user from performing any phone sani-
tization procedure before disclosure. This differentiates the
secure deletion problem from data deletion in the context of
repurposed hardware [4].
This strong attacker model also means that simple solutions
to preserving data confidentiality under device compromise
will fail. Encryption of all the data that is written onto
the device would not work since the adversary will be given
all our encryption keys. The use of factory reset would not
be practical as the unpredictable compromise time would re-
quire erasing the entire phone’s memory with such frequency
that little useful data could reside on the device.
We therefore need novel solutions to this problem. We con-
sider solutions at two levels of system integration: user-level
and kernel-level. User-level means that our application can
only perform actions that a normal application installed
from the marketplace can perform. This mode of access
is greatly limited: an application’s interaction with the file
system consists solely of the creation and deletion of its own
local files. It cannot change the file system’s behaviour in
any way to achieve secure deletion. Kernel-level access is
much less limited: it assumes that arbitrary changes can be
made to the file system and a new kernel can be installed
on the device.
Log-structured File Systems. A log-structured file system
differs from a traditional block-based file system (such as
FAT or ext2) in that the entire file system is stored as a
chronological record of changes from the initial empty state.
As files are written, new fixed-size chunks are appended to
the log indicating the resulting change; a chunk can store
either a file’s header or some data, and is always added to
the log’s end. The file system maintains in RAM information
on where the newest version of each header and data chunk
can be found.
Log-structured file systems complicate secure deletion be-
cause the traditional approach of overwriting a file with new
content simply appends a second version of the file, while the
first still remains in the log’s history. Similarly, encrypting
a file will also just append a new encrypted version of that
file, while the plaintext remains in the log.
Data is only removed from a log-structured file system dur-
ing garbage collection. The garbage collector operates at
the erase block level, which has a larger granularity than
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Figure 1: A lifetime of stored data.
a chunk. The file system examines the wasted space in an
erase block and the total remaining free space when deciding
whether to garbage collect the erase block.
YAFFS. Yet Another Flash File System (YAFFS) is a flash-
based log-structured file system that is notably used for the
internal memory of Android mobile phones. YAFFS allo-
cates memory by selecting an unused erase block and al-
locating sequentially the numbered chunks in that block.
When the block contains no more empty chunks, a new
block is selected for allocation by searching for an empty
block. YAFFS searches for empty blocks sequentially, wrap-
ping cyclically when necessary, by the erase block number
as defined by the physical layout of memory on the storage
medium. It begins its search from the last allocated block
and returns the first empty block it finds. When allocating
a block reduces the total number of empty blocks in the sys-
tem below the minimum threshold, then blocks containing
wasted space are compacted to reclaim storage. If there is
no block that can be compacted, that is, there is not a single
unneeded chunk stored on the medium, then YAFFS reports
the file system as full and fails to allocate a block.
Garbage collection in YAFFS is either initiated by a thread
that performs system maintenance, or takes place during
write operations. Usually, only a few chunks are copied at
a time, whereby the work to copy a block is amortized over
many write operations. If the file system contains too few
free blocks then a more aggressive garbage collection is per-
formed. In this case, blocks with less deleted space are col-
lected, and the procedure continues until the entire block
can be reclaimed.
Figure 1 shows the lifetime for stored data. At time t0 the
block is allocated and data is written onto it soon after.
At time t1 the data is deleted. At time t2 the block is re-
allocated, thus removing the data from the medium. The
difference t2− t1 is called the deletion latency, and t2− t0 is
called the block reallocation period.
Flash Memory. Flash memory is a non-volatile storage
medium consisting of an array of electrical components that
store information. The contents of flash memory cannot be
altered in place, but rather an erase procedure must be per-
formed on a larger granularity than reading or writing. Flash
erasure is costly: its increased voltage requirement precipi-
tate the wearing out of the medium. Erase blocks can only
handle a finite number of erasure operations—roughly 104
to 105 [15]—before becoming unusable.
Flash file systems are typically log-structured for two rea-
sons. First, the large erase granularity of flash memory
maps exactly to the garbage collector’s erase blocks in a log-
structured file system. Second, log-structured file systems
do not require in-place updates for data; this is well-suited
to flash memory’s inability to perform in-place updates.
3. DATA DELETION GUARANTEES IN
EXISTING YAFFS SYSTEMS
In this section, we investigate data persistence on Android
phones. We examine the time that it takes for one erase
block to be reclaimed after being marked for deletion. In
particular, we measure the average and worst-case data dele-
tion latency for specific devices, application configurations
and usage patterns. To measure the average time taken for
block reallocation, which implies the deletion of any data
previously stored on the block, we instrument the file sys-
tem at the kernel level to log block allocation information.
Our results show the existence of a large deletion latency,
where data that a user may believe to be deleted in reality
remains accessible on the mobile phone. This motivates our
secure deletion solutions in the next sections.
3.1 Instrumented YAFFS
We built a modified version of the YAFFS Linux kernel mod-
ule that logs data about block allocations and chunk writes.
We log whenever a new block is allocated, which signals that
the block is now empty and that whatever data was previ-
ously on the block has been erased (or moved). We also log
every write operation: both of file headers and of file data.
This allows us to determine how often writes occur, in which
chunks they occur, and when files are deleted.
During block allocations, we log the system time in microsec-
onds, the unique physical block number (in our case, ranging
from 1 to 1570), the block’s sequence number, and the num-
ber of free chunks and erased blocks according to YAFFS’s
statistics. We also log the file system’s partition name to
demultiplex the data, as the Android phone has multiple
YAFFS partitions.
Logging every chunk write gives us a fine-grained view of
the system’s writing and deleting behaviour. We log the
system time in microseconds, the chunk’s physical location,
the operating system’s owner of the file, the block on which
it is written, the type of data being written (i.e., a file, a
directory, a header, etc.), the file id, and where in the file
the data is being written.
With the collected information, we can determine how much
data is written to the file system, and the timing and fre-
quency of block erasures. We can also log the time when
we write a particular file to the file system, which we cross-
reference in our logs to determine the block number on which
it resides. Given this information, along with the time when
each block is erased and the time the data was marked for
deletion by the user, we can compute the deletion latency
(cf. Figure 1).
By logging the ownership of chunks, we can also determine
the distinct writing patterns of different running applica-
tions. We will later use this to construct profiles that model
Browser Maps Game Gallery Overall
Running time (s) 504 395 300 240 1439
Allocated blocks 185 87 1 2 247
Never deleted 168 75 1 2 199
Mean reallocation period (s) 54 75 N/A N/A 271
Table 1: Average reallocation period for different commonly
used applications. The test ran for 23 minutes and allocated
304 blocks.
different scenarios in our simulated environment.
3.2 Deletion Latency on Android
To understand the severity of the existing problem with cur-
rent implementations, we examine in detail the deletion la-
tency on an Android phone. First, we focus on a subset of
applications that could be used daily on a smart phone to de-
termine deletion latency when using only such applications.
We then continue to use the phone throughout our daily rou-
tine to find out, on average, how long data remains “alive”
on the system before being erased. The data we collected
on the phone’s writing patterns was later used to simulate
an Android mobile phone.
The system under test is a Nexus One running the latest
Android OS (2.2.1) under what can be considered normal
daily use: browsing the web, saving images, listening to mu-
sic, writing and receiving SMS messages, and making calls.
To understand the writing patterns of some commonly used
applications, we let a user use the phone’s browser, maps
and gallery applications plus a popular game found on the
Android Market. The user used the phone unaware of the
test, thereby eliminating any bias which could be introduced
by knowing which system properties were examined.
Writing Patterns. For the browser test, the user surfed the
web for approximately 8 minutes, performing activities such
as logging into a university website, getting weather fore-
casts, and searching for images. For the maps case, the user
interacted with the application for approximately 6 minutes,
searching for a particular destination, looking at its “street
view” and calculating a route to it. The game and gallery
examples ran for approximately 4-5 minutes each.
Statistics for each test are summarized in Table 1 and exam-
ple traces are plotted in Figure 2. The absence of lines after
allocation of some blocks indicates that their content is still
present on the system after their deletion time. This short
usage scenario, which was executed for 23 minutes, gives an
idea of how commonly used applications write to disk.
Deletion Latency. To get a better idea of deletion latency,
we used the instrumented phone daily. The experiment
lasted 670 hours, roughly 27.9 days. In total, throughout the
experiment, we recorded 20345 block allocations initiated by
73 different writers. A writer could be any application in-
cluding the Android OS itself or one of its services (e.g.,
GPS, DHCP, compass, etc.). The experiment’s logs show
that blocks are reclaimed, on average, every 44.7 hours (the
median being 44.5 hours). The worst case for block reallo-
cation time for the experiment is 327.7 hours. This is not
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Figure 2: Snapshot of block allocations for two different appli-
cations. Dots represent block allocations. The only blocks that
are reallocated are the ones between which a line is present. The
line shows the time those blocks have been “alive” in the system
before being reallocated. All other blocks are never reallocated
throughout the test.
surprising given the YAFFS implementation, but it high-
lights the critical need for secure deletion solutions.
4. USER-SPACE SECURE DELETION
In this section, we introduce two solutions for secure dele-
tion: purging and ballooning. Both solutions work at user-
level and are designed for the scenario where a security-
conscious mobile phone user wants to install a secure dele-
tion application from an application marketplace, but is un-
willing to install a new phone operating system.
A user-level application has limited access to the flash de-
vice. The application cannot force the file system to perform
block erasures, prioritize garbage collection of particular ar-
eas in memory, or even know where on the device the user’s
data is stored. The interface to the file system for such ap-
plications consists of the creation, modification, and deletion
of the user’s own local files. In the next section we show a
simpler solution that requires kernel-level modifications to
the Android mobile phone; here we propose a solution for
this highly-constrained environment.
4.1 Purging
To guarantee the secure deletion of all sensitive data on a
YAFFS file system from user-space requires that we delete
all the sensitive data and then completely fill the drive with
new data. The fact that it must be completely filled follows
from the implementation of YAFFS’s block allocation strat-
egy. In the worst case, we must assume a deleted chunk is
the only deleted chunk on an erase block of otherwise live
data. The block allocation strategy first uses empty blocks,
then compacts non-empty blocks by selecting the one with
the fewest number of live chunks. In the worst case, when
all other erase blocks have at least two empty chunks, then
only by filling the drive to complete capacity are we assured
that our deleted chunk is securely erased.
Purging is the operation that completely fills the file sys-
tem’s empty space with a junk file, thereby ensuring that
all previously deleted data is securely erased. After filling
the drive, the junk file is deleted so that file system is again
usable. It is a rapid operation that must be explicitly exe-
cuted. This can take the form of automated triggers, which
execute periodically when the phone is idle, whenever the
browser cache is cleared, when particular apps are closed, or
upon receipt of SMS messages with self-destruction requests.
It is particularly useful for employees who are contractually
obligated to delete customer data before crossing a border.
Completely filling the drive is possible provided the user
is not subjected to disk-quota limitations, but it typically
requires garbage collecting (i.e., erasing) nearly every erase
block on the storage medium. This is because deleted chunks
can occur in any erase block that sees active use, resulting
in small data gaps throughout the file system—even chunk-
aligned appends will still erase the previous file header.
To test our hypothesis, we performed the following exper-
iment. We first configured an Android phone to run with
our instrumented YAFFS implementation. We took a pris-
tine snapshot of the phone’s internal NAND memory by log-
ging into the phone as root, unmounting the flash drive, and
copying the raw data using cat from /dev/mtd/mtd5 (the de-
vice that corresponds to the phone’s data partition) to the
phone’s external memory (SD card). The resulting file was
then copied to our PC and examined using grep and hex-
dump. We wrote an arbitrary secret pattern not yet written
on the device, and obtained a memory snapshot to confirm
it had been written. We then deleted the pattern, obtained
a new snapshot of the memory, and confirmed that the pat-
tern still remained in memory. Finally, we filled the drive to
capacity with a junk file, deleted it, and obtained another
snapshot to confirm that the pattern was now irrecoverable.
The time it took to execute the purge operation was between
thirty seconds to a minute.
Figure 3 shows the resulting block allocations reported by
the instrumented version of YAFFS around the time of this
experiment. The X-axis corresponds to time in hours, and
the Y-axis shows the numbered erase blocks. A small square
in the graph indicates when each erase block was allocated.
At the right side, we see the near immediate allocation of
every block on the medium. This is the consequence of fill-
ing the drive to capacity; YAFFS must effectively garbage
collect every block so as to reclaim every available chunk.
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Figure 3: Block allocation times on an Android device. The
time between two points on the same horizontal line is the block
reallocation period. The data is a sample of live data taken from
a Nexus One phone. At around 75 hours into the experiment,
the drive was completely filled to guarantee all previously deleted
data was removed.
4.2 Ballooning
In contrast to purging, which guarantees rapid secure dele-
tion of data from user-space, we now present ballooning,
which achieves probabilistic continuous secure deletion. Bal-
looning reduces the expected time any deleted data—regardless
of when it is deleted—remains accessible on a mobile phone.
We begin by looking at the time between subsequent allo-
cations of the same flash erase block, which is the time that
data written on that block is accessible.
The block reallocation period in a log-structured file system
is the expected time that will elapse between allocations of a
block in the file system (cf. Figure 1). This is based mainly
on two factors: the write frequency on the medium, and
the expected number of other blocks that will be allocated
before the particular block is reallocated. Were the stor-
age medium’s size to increase tenfold, one would expect to
observe a similar increase in the block reallocation period.
The type of contents on the block also has an effect: long-
term operating system files tend not to be deleted, and there-
fore blocks containing only such files will not be reallocated
as their contents tend not to be deleted. Such blocks are
clearly not a concern for secure deletion, and so their ex-
istence only decreases the expected number of blocks that
will be used for non-permanent data storage. The block re-
allocation period is proportional to the expected number of
blocks used for active storage and inversely proportional to
the number of blocks that are allocated per unit time.
The cyclic behaviour of block allocations in YAFFS is evi-
dent in Figure 4 (cf. Figure 3), which shows the sequence of
block allocations from our collected Android mobile phone
data. While some noise exists, we see that block allocation
numbers generally increase over time and wrap cyclically,
and so the block reallocation period is dependent on both
the number of blocks and the system-wide time between
block allocations.
Our proposal is to fill the file system with junk content,
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Figure 4: YAFFS’ block allocations over time on an Android
phone.
kernel spaceuser space
YAFFS2
junk_sizemax_thresholdmin_threshold
Balloon App
if n < min_threshold
if n > max_threshold
sleep
free_space = n
stat free_space
delete junk
write junk
Figure 5: Architecture of the ballooning application.
thereby reducing the block reallocation period. This re-
duction results from fewer blocks being available for alloca-
tion, and will thus reduce the deletion latency. As a result,
YAFFS will be forced to employ more frequent garbage col-
lection, as the file system will perpetually believe it is in a
state of reduced capacity. Our application will delete the
junk files when the drive requires more space, and will re-
generate them whenever there is “too much” free space.
4.3 Ballooning Application
The operation of our ballooning application is illustrated in
Figure 5. It runs periodically on the Android phone, exam-
ining the file system (using stat) to determine the number
of free chunks. It creates junk files if the free capacity ex-
ceeds the upper threshold, and deletes junk files (if possible)
when the free space drops below the minimum. The junk
files’ exact size is also parameterizable, and defined in mul-
tiples of erase blocks—deleting one junk file will free at least
one erase block for new data.
The oldest junk file is always deleted before more recent
ones to load-balance the wear on the flash memory. Long-
lived junk files can also be erased, with new ones written, to
ensure that their corresponding erase blocks will be used for
more active data storage. The new ones should be written
before deleting the old ones to ensure they reside on different
erase blocks. This system is illustrated in Figure 5.
We implemented our application and ran it successfully on
the Android phone. The only permission it required was
the ability to run while the phone was in a locked state; the
application also needs to specify that it will run as a service,
meaning execution occurs even when the application is not
in the foreground. The application can be installed without
any elevated privileges on the phone and operates entirely
in user-space. Ballooning must maintain a minimum of 5%
of the blocks free to avoid perpetual warnings about low free
space.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
Besides running our application on the Android phone, we
collected more statistics by simulating its behaviour on a
simulated flash drive mounted as a YAFFS file system. We
implemented this drive in RAM using the kernel module
nandsim. Nandsim creates a virtual flash device that can be
mounted as any flash-based file system. We wrote a discrete
event simulator that writes, overwrites, and deletes files on
the phone’s storage, which is simply a mounted directory on
our simulation computer.
Our real-life Android phone usage, described in Section 3.2,
was used to generate all the probability distributions for file
creation, modification, and deletion. After a week of logging
all write activities on the phone, we computed the following
two distributions for each Android writing application: the
time between successive creations of two new files, and the
type of file to create. A file type is defined by its lifetime, a
distribution over the period between opening a file for write,
a distribution over the number of chunks to write to a file
each time it is opened, and a distribution over the chunks of
a file that indicates where the writes will occur.
Additionally, we implemented a secret writer that operated
alongside the simulated writers. It infrequently wrote a
one-chunk secret message, waited until a new block was al-
located, and deleted the secret message.1 We logged the
time before and after we opened the file to write the secret
message, and the time it was deleted. By cross-referencing
this with our block allocation information, we determined
to which blocks the secret was written, and the time when
these blocks were reclaimed thus erasing the secret.
In our YAFFS implementation, we measured the rate of
block allocations, which allowed us to compute the addi-
tional cost of Ballooning as follows. The block allocation
rate tells us directly the rate that chunks are written to the
flash device. Data can be written from two sources: the
actual data written by the simulator, and data copied by
YAFFS’s garbage collection mechanism. Since we are using
fixed write distributions, the expected rate of writes from
the simulator is identical between experiments. Therefore,
the observed disparity in block allocation rates reflects ex-
actly the additional writes that are required by our space
filling application to achieve secure deletion.
Figure 6 (cf. Figure 3) shows YAFFS block allocations when
using our ballooning application. We see that as the range of
possible block allocations shrinks considerably, the sequen-
1Non-immediate deletion was done to avoid having an erase
header get collocated with file data, since YAFFS considers
erase headers as live data until all other traces of the file are
removed from the medium.
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Figure 6: YAFFS’ block allocations over time on a simulated
Android phone running our ballooning application.
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Figure 7: Scatter plot of average block allocations per hour and
median secret erasure time in hour different ballooning simulation
with a variety of parameters.
tial allocation strategy becomes much more erratic, and the
block reallocation period decreases. Rows in Figure 6 that
contain no allocation activity correspond to erase blocks that
have now been assigned junk files.
To quantify the benefit of our application—that is, how
promptly the secure deletion of sensitive data occurs—we
measure the expected time sensitive data remains on the
storage medium. We calculate this measurement using our
secret writer that periodically writes one block secrets onto
the medium and then deletes them. We then compute how
long the written secrets remained on the device.
Our application’s parameters are the size of the junk files,
the lower threshold on the file system’s free space when junk
files are deleted, and the upper threshold when junk files are
created. These variables affect the total expected free space
on the partition during execution, which will be in the range
defined by the thresholds. This is typically, though not al-
ways, between the lower threshold and the size of one junk
file. The amount of free space on the drive is what affects
both deletion time and the block allocation rate. To get an
idea of how these parameters are affected, we ran our sim-
ulation for different parameters and computed the median
Free space Block allocs Ratio
(erase blocks) per hour
No ballooning 32.57± 1.13 1
250 52.54± 4.43 1.61
50 137.47± 26.92 4.22
25 196.00± 19.03 6.02
10 325.37± 36.84 9.99
Table 3: Block allocations per hour for different configuration
parameters. The ratio column is the proportion with regards to
not using the ballooning application.
erasure time and block allocation rate. Figure 7 shows the
result of this experiment, which is a scatter plot with the
median deletion time on the Y-axis and block allocations
per hour on the X-axis; each point on the plot shows the
results from one of our simulations. We see from the fig-
ure that these two quantities are inversely proportional. As
the block allocations rate increases—due to less free space
and thus more frequent garbage collection—the time secrets
remain on the device decreases.
We selected some representative configuration parameters
and investigated them further. Table 2 shows measurements
of the deletion time distribution (measured in hours) includ-
ing the minimum, median and maximum measures. Each
row of the table corresponds to a different amount of free
space (measured in the expected number of free erase blocks)
as affected by using a specific parameter set for our balloon-
ing application. For each parameter set, the simulation was
run eight times; the results were averaged and the 95% con-
fidence intervals were computed.
We observe that by leaving still 250 blocks free, correspond-
ing to 15% of the drive’s capacity, we get much better secret
erasure times than if ballooning is not used, and in the ex-
treme case of 10 free blocks, half the secrets are deleted in
an hour and a quarter.
Since each run of the simulation uses identical write proba-
bility distributions, we have shown that limiting the drive’s
spare capacity must result in more frequent and less optimal
garbage collections. This is measured as the rate of block al-
locations, and in particular, the ratio between the expected
rate and the observed rate represents the scale of the addi-
tional cost of our application. Table 3 shows the results for
block allocations (abbreviated as allocs) per hour using the
same selected parameters for our program as with Table 2.
We see from Table 3 that limiting the available space signif-
icantly impacts the block allocation rate. The first step, at
250 blocks free, has only a 61% increase in block allocations
and reasonably fast deletion. However, achieving deletion in
less than an hour requires much more frequent block allo-
cation. In the next section, we look at how increased block
allocations affect the device wear in terms of flash memory
and battery consumption.
4.5 Wear and Tear
The primary drawback of our approach is the additional
wear that increased erasures put on the mobile phone, both
in terms of damage to the flash memory and power consump-
Free space Percentile Measurements
(erase blocks) 1st 50th 90th 95th 100th
No ballooning 40.18± 3.93 48.76± 1.32 55.88± 2.24 56.99± 2.37 58.93± 2.32
250 7.92± 1.62 15.06± 1.51 22.82± 1.68 23.77± 1.61 25.03± 1.29
50 0.08± 0.03 4.51± 0.57 8.37± 0.69 9.28± 1.03 10.54± 1.41
25 0.06± 0.05 2.36± 0.32 5.24± 0.81 6.25± 1.20 9.59± 1.79
10 0.02± 0.01 1.26± 0.18 3.14± 0.27 3.81± 0.43 17.42± 11.29
Purging 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Deletion time in hours for different configuration parameters.
Free space Expected minimum
(erase blocks) lifetime (years)
No ballooning 55.1
250 34.1
50 11.7
25 9.1
10 5.5
Table 4: Expected minimum device lifetime at various block
allocation rates.
tion. If this approach significantly reduced the phone’s life-
time or battery life, then it would be a concern for adoption.
We therefore performed experiments to investigate this.
The additional wear is directly proportional to the increase
in the block allocation rate, and inversely proportional to
the lifespan. We convert the block allocation rate into an
expected lifetime in years using 1571 erase blocks available
on the Android’s data partition and the very conservative es-
timate of 104 erasures per block. (Recall that a typical flash
erase block can handle between 104 and 105 erasures [15]).
Table 4 shows the plot of the expected minimum lifespan
of an Android phone running continuously at varying block
allocation rates. We see that device wear is not a concern
even with our conservative estimate of block lifetime. A
device running without our application can expect a lifespan
of almost 6 decades—well beyond the replacement period of
mobile phones. Even running our application with the most
aggressive parameters still results in a lifetime of more than
5 years. We observe there exists a trade off between wear
on the device and secure deletion, and so the user can select
their desired device lifespan to tune their security parameter.
To test if ballooning has acceptable power requirements, we
analyzed the power consumption of write operations. We
measured the battery level through the Android API, which
gives its current charge as a percentage of its capacity. The
experiment consisted of continuously writing data to the
flash memory of the phone in a background service while
monitoring the battery level in the foreground. We mea-
sured how much data must be written to drain 10% of the
total battery capacity. We ran the experiment four times
and averaged the result. The resulting mean is within the
range of 11.01 ± 0.22 GB with a confidence of 95%, corre-
sponding to 90483 full erase blocks worth of data. Since this
well exceeds the total of 1570 erase blocks on the Android’s
data partition, we are assured our experiment must have
erased the blocks as well as written to them, thus measuring
the cost of erasure. Even using the most aggressive bal-
looning strategy, where 325.37 blocks are allocated an hour,
it will still take 11.5 days for the ballooning application to
consume ten percent of the battery. Furthermore, by look-
ing at the built-in battery use information, we learned that
the testing application was responsible for only 3% of bat-
tery usage, while the Android system accounted for 10% and
the display for 87%. We conclude that ballooning’s power
consumption is not a concern.
5. KERNEL-SPACE SECURE DELETION
Our second solution for secure deletion is at the kernel layer,
where we modify the YAFFS file system. This models the
scenario where a mobile phone user is willing to install a
custom kernel for their mobile phone and has super-user ac-
cess to the hardware. Our goal is to provide a simple, easily
auditable, and small change to the file system to achieve
secure deletion of all deleted data without additional user
action.
The principle behind NAND flash programming is that an
erasure sets all bits to the value of binary one, and program-
ming simply selects some bit positions to instead have the
value of binary zero. It is not possible to program a zero into
a one, as this operation requires erasing the corresponding
erase block. Programming a flash chunk multiple times be-
tween erasures is known as multiple programming. The orig-
inal version of YAFFS (YAFFS1) used multiple program-
ming to set a deleted flag [3]. When a chunk was deleted, it
was reprogrammed so this flag was set to zero, obviating the
need to perform reverse lookups in memory data structures
to determine which chunks should be copied during garbage
collection. This technique was removed in YAFFS2 to be
more portable for flash memory that do not permit multiple
programming.
Our solution is to use the YAFFS1 technique of multiple
programming to instead rewrite the entire chunk’s contents
to zeros, thus removing the data from the system. Since the
Android’s hardware supports multiple programming, porta-
bility is not a concern for the patched kernel. This solution
requires super-user permissions to install a new YAFFS ver-
sion. It is attractive because it requires only a tiny change
to YAFFS to enable guaranteed immediate secure deletion
without causing any additional wear on the device. Figure 8
shows an example of how zero overwriting removes sensitive
information.
This solution may still leak information through advanced
forensic techniques, perhaps allowing an observer to deter-
mine how recently a gate was set to zero, thus indicating
t1 0110010101001 1100101011100
t0 1111111111111 1111111111111
t2 0000000000000 1100101011100
t3 1111111111111 1111111111111
erase block
chunk chunk
Figure 8: The state of an erase block at different times. t0 is
the initial state of the memory. t1 is the state after some chunks
have been written to the memory. t2 shows how we can select
one chunk to be written over with zeros, while the data remains
on the other chunk. t3 shows the memory after erasing the entire
erase block, returning it to the initial state.
which bits were simultaneously reprogrammed. As analog
forensics on flash memory are outside the scope of this pa-
per, we leave this investigation as future work.
The benefit of this solution is that it requires no block era-
sures to delete information. All data is immediately removed
when it is no longer needed, and the flash hardware need
not erase any additional blocks to achieve secure deletion.
Therefore, there is no additional wear on the device itself—
except for the minuscule voltage required to program the
chunk to contain only zeros.
5.1 Implementation
Our change to YAFFS is less than a dozen lines of C code,
and is contained mostly in the yaffs_chunk_del() function.
This function handles the deletion of a chunk from internal
memory structures, and is invoked whenever a chunk is no
longer needed by the file system, such as deleting a file, trun-
cating it, or overwriting a part of it. We enhance the method
to overwrite the entire deleted chunk with zeros, using the
same technique used to set the deleted flag in the tags—
which is also implemented in the same function and used
when the device is mounted as a YAFFS1 drive. The other
change is in the flash write function, where we removed a
kernel oops—the kernel equivalent of a segmentation fault—
that prohibited empty chunk tags.
5.2 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented our approach and tested its correctness by
writing information, deleting it, and then searching the raw
memory for the information using grep and hexdump. Raw
data was collected from the NAND simulator by unmounting
/dev/mtdblock0 (the device that corresponds to our simula-
tor) and using the program dd to copy the full contents. Raw
data was collected and examined from the Android phone
using the technique described in Section 4.1.
Our deletion tests consisted of creating a file with some sen-
sitive information and then erasing it different ways. We
tested the following: a deleted file, a file completely over-
written, a file partially overwritten, a file completely trun-
cated, and a file partially truncated. The tests using partial
truncation and overwriting always erased the entire sensi-
tive part of the file. Tests were done using block-aligned
and block-unaligned overwriting and truncation. We first
ran our tests using the standard version of YAFFS, ensur-
ing that the data was still recoverable. In each test, the
sensitive data is completely erased from the file system, but
remains accessible by unmounting it and reading the raw
data. Using our modified version of YAFFS, we found that
the information was irrecoverable from both the file system
and the underlying flash medium immediately after running
the deletion tests.
A trade off with this solution is that deleting or truncating
files is a linear operation in their size, as the zero overwriting
happens in the foreground. It is also wasteful when a chunk
is overwritten shortly before the entire erase block is erased.
It would be possible to write a larger YAFFS patch that
maintains a list of blocks that need to be zero overwritten,
with a sanitization daemon running in the background; this
approach is used to provide secure deletion to the ext2 file
system [1]. Care would be needed to ensure that sanitization
is not performed if the erased block has been erased (and
new data added) since it was queued for sanitization.
6. RELATEDWORK
Lee et al. [10] present a secure deletion approach for YAFFS
using encryption. They encrypt every file, and include the
corresponding encryption key in every file header written to
the file system. Secure deletion is thus achieved whenever all
the headers for a file are deleted. They propose changing the
deletion code to force deletion of header blocks containing
file keys. Their approach is elegant in that files are seam-
lessly encrypted and decrypted by their proposed changes to
the YAFFS file system, and it reduces the problem of rapid
secure deletion to the problem of collocating headers for the
same file. They collocate headers using an in-memory prefix-
tree based on the file id, where all file headers on a leaf node
will reside on the same block. A leaf node is split into two
nodes when it is half full.
It is difficult to compare their approach with ours in experi-
ments because their approach was not implemented. More-
over, despite detailed algorithms, they had not considered
contracting paired leaf nodes when they are sparsely full;
over time the file system space for header data might sprawl
as tree growth is never curtailed. They simulated their al-
gorithm by assuming files were modified at most twice; our
examination of Android phone data found that a third of
all chunks were file headers, suggesting much more frequent
modifications. Since their strategy is based on treating head-
ers specially, it is important to model them realistically.
They intend to delete file header blocks each time a file is
removed; however our data indicates that Android phones
delete nearly 10000 tiny cache files a day—securely delet-
ing each would result in the frequent creation of bad blocks.
We suspect it would be better to delay and batch deletions,
and instead of collocating file headers based on arbitrary file
id, use attributes that may predict similar lifetimes, such as
creation time or file owner. Finally, they add secure deletion
by changing an existing file system, but do not examine how
their changes effect the original design decisions of the file
system. Device wear concerns from header collocation and
increased erasures were not discussed in their paper.
Wei et al. [16] have considered secure deletion on flash stor-
age in the context of solid state drives (SDDs). An SSD
makes use of a Flash Translation Layer (FTL). This layer
allows a regular block-based file system (such as FAT) to
be used on flash memory by handling the nuances of erase
blocks opaquely through the FTL’s layer of indirection. This
layer has the same effect as a log-structured file system,
where the FTL writes new entries at empty locations, so old
entries remain until the entire erase block can be reclaimed.
They executed traditional block-based approaches to secure
deletion and determined that they do not properly sanitize
data on flash storage. They also showed alarmingly that
some built-in sanitization methods do not function correctly
either. They propose to address this concern by having flash
hardware manufacturers make use of zero overwriting, and
add it into the FTL hardware. They state that circumvent-
ing the problem of a lack of secure deletion requires changes
in the FTL, but depending on how the FTL is implemented,
our user-level approaches may also succeed similarly without
requiring hardware changes.
7. DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
We presented three solutions for secure deletion on YAFFS
file systems: purging and ballooning at the user-level, and
zero overwriting at the kernel level. The kernel-level solution
is the most effective, and suitable for any user who is willing
to apply a small patch to their file system. Ballooning is
useful for users who wish to guard their location privacy by
not having their phones likely to record more than a user-
specified time interval of location data. Purging is useful for
users who wish to be assured that some deleted data has
been securely erased from their phone.
Generalizing our Approach. Purging will work for any
log-structured file system provided both the user’s disk quota
is unlimited and the file system always performs garbage
collection to reclaim even a single chunk of memory before
declaring that the drive is unwritable.
Ballooning’s utility varies with the implementation details
of the underlying file system. For example, JFFS is another
log-structured flash file system that uses a linear block al-
location scheme. This assures “perfect” wear levelling; the
erasure count of any two blocks on the medium will differ
by at most one. Consequently, filling the drive to near ca-
pacity will result in thrashing where all the stored data is
continually being shuffled.
Zero overwriting will work for any type of file system, pro-
vided that both the underlying flash memory permits the
second programming to occur, and the file system will never
attempt to read memory that it has already deleted. Note
that this is not the case in YAFFS1, where deleted chunks
are re-read during garbage collection to determined if they
had been marked (through reprogramming) as deleted.
The UBI Flash Interface. Recently, Nokia has developed
a new flash interface, called Unsorted Block Images (UBI),
which allows in-place updates and removes the concerns of
both wear-levelling and bad block detection. UBI exposes
the following interface based on logical erase blocks (LEBs):
read and write to a LEB, erase an entire LEB, and atom-
ically update the contents of an entire LEB (i.e., in-place
edits at the erase block level). It also allows dynamic cre-
ation of UBI partitions using unallocated LEBs. It is neither
possible for an LEB to become bad, nor is wear-levelling a
concern for LEBs.
Underlying this interface is a simple mapping from LEBs
to physical erase blocks (PEBs), where PEBs correspond to
actual erase blocks on the flash medium. Wear monitoring
is handled by maintaining a tally of the erasures at the PEB
level, and transparently remapping LEBs when necessary.
Remapping also occurs when a bad block is detected. De-
spite remapping, a LEB’s numerical identifier will remain
constant regardless of changes to its corresponding PEB.
Ballooning achieved secure deletion by artificially reducing
the size of the flash partition, thus reducing the period be-
tween a block’s allocations. UBI exposes the ability to dy-
namically create partitions from unused logical blocks in its
block pool. It is theoretically possible for UBI to dynami-
cally grow or shrink the size of a partition—were it to know
which blocks are not currently being used by the file system
above it, and were the file system to know that its size is
volatile.
As future work we plan to design and implement dynamic-
resizing capabilities in UBI that would also require minimal
changes to non-UBI-aware file systems like YAFFS. These
file systems view the medium as a contiguous range of num-
bered blocks, along with a mapping from block numbers to
states—either good or bad. A UBI-enhanced YAFFS imple-
mentation might allow for dynamic resizing of its partition
size using the bad blocks map. UBI will manage how many
erase blocks are given to each partition, permitting the op-
timal size of each file system to be controlled by UBI. The
slack space it chooses is based on the trade off between device
wear and secure deletion. UBI would also be able to intel-
ligently monitor the drive, for example observing its write
and erasure rate. It may also give some partitions fewer free
erase blocks than others, when the former are being used
explicitly to store sensitive files such as encryption keys.
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